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THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND VERTICAL
CONFLICTS IN DISTRIBUTION
The Robinson-Patman Amendment to the Clayton Act 1 pro-
vides, in part, that a seller may not discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or
to injure, destroy, or prevent competition.2 It is not clear under
the act whether a seller may lawfully grant a differential in price
which favors direct-buying consumers and commercial users over
the seller's own retailer customers, but the trend of present decisions
seems to be that such discrimination is not unlawful because it
involves no injury to competition. These decisions are logically
related to the problem of the legality of sellers' by-passing of
wholesalers and other intermediaries in vertical channels of distribu-
tion and granting discriminatorily low prices to direct-buying re-
tailers. It is the thesis of this article that countervailing policy
considerations require that this current trend be reversed.
Some consideration of antecedent provisions of the Clayton
Act and the construction accorded them by the courts is necessary
138 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958).
2The sections of the Robinson-Patman Amendment of primary concern herein,
Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a)-(b), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958),
provide as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any
of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such com-
modities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing [herein contained] shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manu-
facture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered: Provided, however, That
the Federal Trade Commission may, after due investigation and hearing to all in-
terested parties, fix and establish quantity limits, and revise the same as it finds
necessary, as to particular commodities or classes of commodities, where it finds that
available purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on
account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line of com-
merce; and the foregoing shall then not be construed to permit differentials based on
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to an understanding of the Robinson-Patman Amendment. The
Clayton Act was passed to overcome inadequacies of the Sherman
Act in preventing industrial concentration and to curb practices
used by business to monopolize markets; the Clayton Act was
primarily a prophylactic measure for combatting incipient monopo-
lization not cognizable under the Sherman Act. Section 2 of the
Clayton Act, aimed primarily at predatory price-cutting, made it
unlawful for a seller to discriminate among buyers in pricing com-
modities where the effect of such discrimination might be to lessen
competition substantially or to tend to create monopoly in any
line of commerce.
Given its broad language, section 2 might have been construed
to apply to discriminatory pricing whether it tended to eliminate
competition among the purchasers of a product or among the
sellers.3 However, when, in Mennen Co. v. FTC,4 a manufacturer
refused to grant wholesaler discounts to a cooperative buying
organization of drug retailers which ordered in wholesale lots, and
the Commission found the practice discriminatory, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed. The court declared that a seller had
a legal right to classify customers and that, as a matter of law, the
cooperative was properly classified as a retail organization since its
members sold to ultimate consumers. And in National Biscuit Co.
v. FTC,5 the court of appeals for the Second Circuit again reversed
the Commission, and upheld a manufacturer's right to grant quan-
tity discounts to a chain store, even though the discounts were
based on total purchases of the whole chain system, deliveries were
differences in quantities greater than those so fixed and established: And provided
further, That nothing [herein contained] shall prevent persons engaged in selling
goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in
bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade: And provided further, That nothing
[herein contained] shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response
to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods
concerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable
goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in
good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned.
(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section,
that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the
burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be
upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall
be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating
the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing [herein contained] shall prevent
a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price
or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made
in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities
furnished by a competitor.
3 Clayton Act § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
4 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923).
5299 Fed. 733 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1924).
[Vol. 26
COMMENT
made separately to each unit, and there were no savings in
delivery costs.
Several years later in George Van Camp & Sons v. American
Can Co.6 and American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co.7 the Su-
preme Court recognized that the act was applicable to some price
discrimination that tended to lessen competition among buyers,
but the Mennen Co. and National Biscuit Co. cases still raised
considerable doubt whether section 2 could become an effective
instrument in preventing price discrimination from injuring com-
petition among buyers as well as sellers. Moreover, in its final
report on the chain store investigation in 1934, the Federal Trade
Commission concluded that section 2 was inadequate to curb exces-
sive concessions to mass buyers."
Thus, an immediate factor behind the demand for a change
in the law was the growing power of chain stores; but Congress
also designed the Robinson-Patman Act to remedy defects the
courts had injected into the Clayton Act. In its report on the
Robinson-Patman Amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Act, it
was the opinion of the Judiciary Committee of the House that
"price discrimination practices exist to such an extent that the
survival of independent merchants, manufacturers, and other busi-
nessmen is seriously imperiled... ." 9 It was also felt that the new
law was needed for "the preservation of equal opportunity to all
usefully employed in the service of distribution comportably with
their ability and equipment to serve the producing and consuming
public with real efficiency . . . ." 10 It has also been observed that
"the Robinson-Patman Act is an effort 'to preserve traditional
marketing channels, (manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer), against
the encroachment of mass distributors and chains.'" 11 The fore-
going observations suggest that the act has some application to
sales which by-pass established channels of distribution.
SALES TO DIRECT-BUYING CONSUMERS
Under an early interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Amend-
ment, some protection seemed to be accorded to retailers who were
charged higher prices than consumers who bought directly from the
same seller. In United States Rubber Co.,"2 the Federal Trade Com-
6278 U.S. 245 (1929).
744 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 899 (1930).
SFederal Trade Commission, "Final Report on Chain Store Investigation," S.
Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 51, 95-96 (1935).
9. H.R. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936).
10 S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936).
11 Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.
N.Y. 1960).
1228 F.T.C. 1489 (1939).
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mission found that United States Rubber Company sold tires
through its wholly owned subsidiary, United States Tire Dealers
Corporation, "in competition with other retail tire dealers in their
respective sales territories. Through said stores respondent sold
and offered to sell tires to certain users and consumers thereof...
at prices ... lower than the prices charged other retail purchasers." 13
Accordingly, the Commission ordered respondent to cease and
desist from discriminating in price "by selling such products to some
users and consumers thereof ... at prices different and lower than
the prices charged other retail purchasers thereof." 4
Subsequent to the United States Rubber decision, a line of
argument developed which is substantially as follows: it would not
be unlawful for a seller to charge the same price to wholesalers and
retailers as he charged to consumers. If a seller followed such a
single price policy, wholesalers and retailers could not compete for
the business of the direct-buying consumer since their markup for
operating expenses and profit would raise their resale prices above
the sale price of the original seller. Since such wholesalers and
retailers would be unable to compete if there were no price discrim-
ination, then there is no injury to them and, therefore, no injury to
competition if a seller quotes a price to direct-buying consumers
that is lower than that which he charges to his wholesaler and
retailer customers. Jarrett v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 5 has been
cited in support of this proposition,-' but its authority is question-
able. In that case, Pittsburgh sued Jarrett on a note, and Jarrett
counter-claimed for a violation of section 2 (a), alleging that he was
a distributor of Pittsburgh's products, and that Pittsburgh had gone
into the retail business in competition with him, and sold goods
"for less than they had previously been sold in Macon and at
[lower] prices than Jarrett as dealer could afford to sell them . ,, 17
The counter-claim was dismissed because it was
not alleged that the prices at which sales were made to Jarrett
were cut as to others, or that prices in Macon were cut below
those made for other like markets, or that there was a refusal to
sell to Jarrett at dealer's prices, or that there was any intent or
any effect to monopolize the business. The Company could retail
its own goods a little cheaper than Jarrett could after buying them
at the usual dealers' prices, and that is all.' 8
131d. at 1501.
14 Id. at 1505.
-15131 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1942).
10 See Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., supra note 11, at 354;
Secatore's Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665, 667 (D. Mass 1959).
17 Jarrett v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., supra note 15, at 676.
18 Ibid.
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The court did not say in the Jarrett case that it would be lawful for
Pittsburgh to offer retail prices to the consuming public which were
lower than the prices offered to Jarrett.
The first express statement that, if a buyer cannot compete at
equal prices, a reduction in price to a favored buyer will not injure
the unfavored buyer is found in A. J. Goodman & Son v. United
Lacquer Mfg. Corp.19 In Goodman defendant was a manufacturer
of yellow traffic lacquer used to mark highways. The State of New
Hampshire called for bids for a delivered price on 18,000 gallons of
yellow traffic lacquer. Defendant quoted for plaintiff a price of 1.85
dollars per gallon, and plaintiff thereupon submitted a bid to the
state at a price of 1.97 dollars per gallon. Defendant also submitted
a direct bid to the state at a price of 1.75 dollars per gallon. The
court granted defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint based on
section 2(a).
Defendant, if it desires to bid, can always, without violating the
law, submit a bid lower than any at which the plaintiff could
offer to sell to the state. It would not violate the law by selling to
the state at the same price at which it was willing to sell to the
plaintiff. Nor would there be any violation if it sold to the state
at a price equal to the lowest price at which any of its competitors
would supply lacquer to the plaintiff. In either case defendant's
price to the state could be equal to the price plaintiff paid, and
hence less than the price at which plaintiff could offer to sell to
the state and still make any profit on the transaction. The contract
would already be lost to plaintiff, and the fact that defendant low-
ered his price still further so that it was either discriminatory or
unreasonably low in itself, could add nothing to the injury.20
The Goodman case cannot, however, be considered controlling as a
statement of law under the Robinson-Patman Act, because there
was only one contract awarded and one sale, and without two or
more sales there can be no basis for determining price discrimination.
Moreover, the sale was made to the state of New Hampshire, and
the prevailing view seems to be that sales to governmental agencies
are without the purview of the Robinson-Patman Amendment.21
Nonetheless, the Goodman rationale was picked up in Seca-
tore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co. 22 In the Secatore's case plain-
tiff operated two large retail gasoline stations, but had no facilities
for selling gasoline off its premises. Defendant Esso was a refiner
1981 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mass. 1949).
20 Id. at 893.
21 General Shale Prod. Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Ky.
1941), aff'd on other grounds, 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942).
22 171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959).
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and distributor of petroleum products who had no retail gasoline
stations. Defendant did sell to certain direct-buying consumers who
took delivery in their own tank trucks or who had their own storage
tanks and pumps and took delivery from Esso trucks. Esso charged
Secatore's more than it charged the direct-buying consumers, and
Secatore's brought an action under the Robinson-Patman Act
which was dismissed on defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The court observed:
Clearly there would be no discrimination if defendant sold to
these ultimate consumers at the same price at which it sells to
plaintiff. But even then plaintiff could not compete with defend-
ant for their business for it would as a matter of practical eco-
nomics have to charge them more than it paid defendant for the
gasoline in order to cover its expenses of operation, to say nothing
of making a profit on the transaction. If plaintiff cannot success-
fully compete with defendant for these customers when there is no
price differential, it is not harmed by any further reduction which
defendant may make in the price it charges to them.23
The Secatore's decision was followed in Sano Petroleum Corp. v.
American Oil Co. 24 Sano, a wholesale distributor of gasoline in a
nonexclusive territory in Brooklyn and Queens, had a requirements
contract with American, a gasoline refiner, and had to get Ameri-
can's approval to add new customers. Sano brought an action
alleging discriminatory sales of gasoline by American to Uneeda, a
distributor in the northern Manhattan and Bronx area who was
functionally the same as Sano, to Swift, a commercial user, and to
Metropolitan Distributors, a truck rental concern which put Amer-
ican gasoline into its rented trucks. In entering judgment against
Sano on all counts, the court was primarily persuaded by "the gist
of Secatore's... that if equality cannot help, discrimination cannot
injure." 25 On the facts the court determined that gasoline was a
standardized commodity in a highly competitive industry and, if
one could not compete in price for large consumer accounts, he
could not compete at all. Therefore, the court reasoned that dis-
crimination in favor of others buying directly from American could
not injure Sano's opportunity to compete. 6
23 Id. at 667.
24 187 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. N.Y. 1960).
25 d. at 354.
26 VWhile the Federal Trade Commission has not expressly endorsed the rationale
of Goodman, Secatore's, and Sano, it has, perhaps, retreated from the position taken in
United States Rubber Co., supra note 12. In Shell Oil Co., 54 F.T.C. 1274 (1958),
Shell entered into a consent decree which sanctioned lower gasoline prices to taxi
fleet user accounts than to gasoline dealers.
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Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Goodman, Secatore's,
and Sano decisions is that, if the analysis which precluded a finding
of injury to competition in those cases of discriminatory prices to
direct-buying consumers were to be accepted as valid, the logic
would be equally applicable to negate alleged injury to competition
in the case of a seller's by-passing the wholesaler and giving lower
prices to a direct-buying retailer. The case law has, however, de-
veloped differently in the latter type of case. The reason for the
different development may result from the historical militancy of
wholesalers in favor of both the Robinson-Patman Amendment and
functional discounts.
SALES TO DIREcT-BUYING RETAILERS
Functional discounts are an economic recognition by a manu-
facturing or processing seller of the value of certain services per-
formed by wholesalers and other middlemen. Among others, these
services may include warehousing, delivery, assumption of the cost
and risk of servicing small retailer accounts, and the training and
guidance of small retailers. Due to the precarious financial condi-
tion and consequent attrition of many small, marginal retailers, the
credit or risktaking function is one of the most important contribu-
tions of the wholesaler. Moreover, inasmuch as this risk substan-
tially disappears when the manufacturer is dealing with a large,
direct-buying retailer, such a retailer would not be entitled to a
functional, or cost-justified discount.27 Unless a manufacturer or
processing seller chooses to forego retailing through small business-
men, either he or his distributor must assume the credit risk func-
tion. While the Robinson-Patman Amendment was being considered
in Congress, wholesalers made a concerted effort to have incorpo-
rated into the act functional discounts proportional to the services
performed by them on behalf of their sellers. In the original reports
of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the proposed act
included explicit authorization of functional discounts. The House
eliminated the provision before the bill was passed and, while the
Senate retained the provision in passing the bill, it was eliminated
entirely in conference committee. 8 It remains unclear from the
broad provisions of the act what disposition was finally intended for
functional discounts."9
It has been established under the act that a seller who deals
stimultaneously with buyers at different levels in the chain of
distribution does not violate section 2(a) of the act by granting
27 Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 7, at 10-11 (1959).2SPalamountain, The Politics of Distribution 203-31 (1955).
29 See Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 286 n.1 (1959).
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functional discounts, or by charging his lowest prices to whole-
salers, his next lowest price to retailers, and his highest prices
to consumers.3 On the other hand, a seller may not grant his
wholesalers or jobbers so-called functional discounts which are so
large as to give the wholesalers' customers a competitive advan-
tage over the seller's direct-buying retailer customers; that is, a
manufacturer or processing seller may not follow a price policy
which favors indirect buyers over direct buyers.31 And the sel-
ler who establishes a system of functional discounts may not ar-
bitrarily classify his customers; that is, the functional discount
granted must bear some relationship to the value and nature of
the services performed by the buyer receiving it.32
It may be argued that the Robinson-Patman Amendment re-
quires functional discounts. If a wholesaler pays the same price
as a direct-buying retailer, he is not being compensated for the
distributive services he performs for the seller. Inasmuch as the
direct-buying retailer does not bear the cost of many whole-
saler functions, the single price policy is economically discrim-
inatory.33 That such an economic discrimination does exist seems
to be generally conceded.34 The argument was most fully advanced
in Klien v. Lione33 by a retailer customer of a toy jobber against
the toy manufacturer, who sold at the same net price to toy
jobbers and direct-buying retail chains. The District Court rejected
the argument:
It is difficult to see, however, how the conclusion contended
for would not result in a flagrant violation of the Robinson-
Patman Act and accomplish precisely that which the Act was
30 Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F2d 1, 10 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950). See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
31 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, supra note 30.
32 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
33 Congressman Patman recently wrote:
There is no requirement in the law for a seller to make different prices to
different customers. However, the thrust of the Robinson-Patman Act is against
discriminatory treatment of customers. For that reason, a seller who has organ-
ized his business primarily to sell to wholesalers, depending on them to perform
saleswork, warehousing, and other functions incident to the sale and distribution
of the seller's products, may be considered to have engaged in discriminatory
conduct if he should not make promotional allowances to his wholesaler-customers
as compensation to them for the sales promotional work they have performed in
promoting the sale of the seller's products. These allowances would be in addition
to those made to direct-buying retailer accounts who perform no general sales
promotional functions particularly directed to the specific seller's products.
34 See Att'y. Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 206 n.246 (1955); Hearings on
H.R. 848, supra note 27, at 46.
35 138 F. Supp. 560 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd on other grounds, 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir.
1956).
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intended to prevent, viz., a discrimination in price between two
purchasers from the same seller.3 6
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, but solely
on the ground that the indirect-buying retailer was not a custo-
mer of the manufacturer and, therefore, could not sue. The argu-
ment has also been rejected and a single price policy upheld in
Federal Trade Commission proceedings.
In response to sanctioning by the courts of a single price
policy, wholesalers and other middlemen returned to Congress
in a new effort to have functional discounts made mandatory un-
der the Robinson-Patman Amendment.38 The bills would have
provided, in effect, that when a seller limits the functional classes
or number of persons in any functional class to whom he sells,
it shall constitute a discrimination within the meaning of section
2(a) of the Clayton Act to fail to maintain a price differential
between purchasers based solely upon their functional capacity,
and that the price differential shall be in an amount reasonably
calculated to enable customers of a functional class entitled to
the differential to compete with members of the customers' func-
tional class who purchase directly from the seller. None of the
bills was passed.
Although it seems that the act does not proscribe price dis-
crimination favoring direct-buying consumers over retailer and
wholesaler customers of the same seller, the prevailing view seems
to be that the act does proscribe discrimination favoring direct-
buying retailers over wholesaler customers of the same seller. The
Federal Trade Commission took this position in Fruitvale Can-
ning Co. 9 Fruitvale was ordered to "cease and desist from dis-
criminating.., by selling to any retailer at prices lower than those
prices charged any wholesaler who competes, or whose customers
compete, with such retailer in the sale or distribution of ...
canned fruits." 40 The same result was reached in private litiga-
tion in Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.4 Krug, a wholesale
distributor of defendant's radios, televisions, and phonographs,
charged I.T.&T. with direct sales to retailers at prices lower than
30 138 F. Supp. at 565.
37 Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937).
38 See, for example, H.R. 10304, H.R. 10305, H.R. 10640, H.R. 10999, and H.R.
11409, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) ; H.R. 848, H.R. 927, H.R. 2788, H.R. 2868, and
HI.. 4530, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) ; H.R. 3465, H.R. 4151, and H.R. 4529, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
39 52 F.T.C. 1504 (1956).
40Id. at 1513.
41 142 F. Supp. 230 (D. N.J. 1956).
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those charged to Krug. The court, in denying defendant's motion
to dismiss, stated:
But there can be no doubt that a violation of section 2(a) may
occur where a manufacturer sells his products to a retailer at a
lower price than that charged the wholesaler whose customers
compete with the retailer. . . . Certainly, one of the well-known
purposes of the Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton
Act was to protect independent wholesalers from discriminatory
concessions given by manufacturers to retailers whose size and
volume of sales lead to a by-passing of the wholesaling function. 42
Should not the rationale of the Goodman, Secatore's, and Sano
cases be applicable in the Fruitvale and Krug cases? In the latter
cases it is clear that the seller may follow a single price policy
with respect to his wholesaler and retailer customers.3 In such
a case both Krug and the wholesaler customers of Fruitvale would
have to increase the price on resale to cover operating expenses
and make a profit. So retailer customers of Krug and Fruitvale's
wholesaler customers would be paying higher prices than retailers
who bought directly from I.T.&T. and Fruitvale, respectively. In
Sano the court observed that if Sano, the distributor, could not
compete in price, he could not compete at all, since commercial
customers would never pay a higher price for a standardized prod-
uct, gasoline."4 Similarly, the Commission found in Fruitvale that
a lower price of one or two cents per can on canned fruit at the
retail level was sufficient to divert customers on both canned fruits
and other products to the retailer charging the lower price for
canned fruit. 5 Thus, it might have been found that equality of
price to Fruitvale's wholesalers would not have helped the whole-
salers' customers vis-a-vis direct-buying retailers, and that there-
fore, price discrimination favoring direct-buying retailers could not
further injure competition and was not proscribed by the act.
Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission has taken the position
that while under present decisions there is a legal difference be-
tween a single price policy and a policy favoring direct-buying
retailers, there is little practical economic difference. 46 Moreover,
42 1d. at 235.
43 Klein v. Lionel, supra note 35.
44 Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., supra note 11, at 355.
45 Fruitvale Canning Co., supra note 39, at 1516.
4 6 Hearings on H.R. 848, supra note 27, at 25. The following colloquy took place
between Earl W. Kintner, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, and Herbert
N. Maletz, Chief Counsel to the Sub-Committee:
Mr. Maletz. Now, take a situation where the manufacturer sells only to
wholesalers and large retailers and his price to these two groups is the same.
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while the court in Sano attempted to distinguish Krug on the
ground that some individual consumers might be willing to pay
relatively higher prices because of "considerations of convenience
and service," the court also distinguished on the basis that Krug
was decided before Secatore's and the "'practical economics' that
controlled Secatore's [if equality cannot help, discrimination cannot
injure] was not at all discussed in Krug and, presumably, was
not raised by the defendant . . . . ,4 The opinion of the court
in Sano and the position of the Federal Trade Commission might
lead to the conclusion that the "gist of Secatore's" should be
applied to situations in which the wholesaler is by-passed and
the direct-buying retailer receives discriminatorily low prices.
It is not so clear, however, that "the gist of Secatore's" is
compatible either with the objectives of the Robinson-Patman
Amendment or with "practical economics" in either the case where
a direct-buying consumer is favored vis-a-vis retailers and whole-
salers or in the case where a direct-buying retailer is favored
vis-a-vis a wholesaler.
COUNTERVAILING POLICY
If it were to be demonstrated by "practical economics" that
in no case is it beneficial in terms of economic efficiency to accord
price protection to a businessman whose functional status places
him further from the consumer than another potentially favored
buyer, this would not be an adequate basis for creating case law
under the Robinson-Patman Amendment. Economic efficiency is
not the sole objective of the antitrust laws. In the Sherman Act
prosecution against Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand stated:
It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to
prefer a system of small producers, each dependent upon his own
In that case, is it not true that the small retailer necessarily must pay the whole-
saler a higher cost for merchandise than the direct buying retailer?
Mr. Kintner. That is correct.
Mr. Maletz. And does it not follow that the small retailer is at a competitive
disadvantage in this kind of situation as compared to the direct buying retailer?
Mr. Kintner. I think that follows.
Mr. Maletz. In practical effect, therefore, is there any real difference be-
tween this type of situation, the single pricing system, and the situation condemned
by the Federal Trade Commission in the Fruitvale case?
Mr. Kintner. Only that you do not have two different prices.
Mr. Maletz. What is the practical economic difference between those two
kinds of situations?
Mr. Kintner. There is not a great practical difference.
47 Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., supra note 11, at 355.
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skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those
engaged must accept the direction of a few ...
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid
monopoly; but, as we have already implied, there are others, based
upon the belief that great industrial consolidations are inherently
undesirable, regardless of their economic results. In the debates in
Congress Senator Sherman himself . ..showed that among the
purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to
great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the
individual before them. . . .Throughout the history of these
statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their pur-
poses was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in
spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units
which can effectively compete with each other.4
8
A similar veiw was expressed in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Douglas in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.4 9 It would seem,
therefore, that the protection of small businessmen who lack price
bargaining power is more than an economic objective: it is also
a political postulate.
In the passage of the Robinson-Patman Amendment some
attempt was made to protect small businessmen from the rigors
of free and open competition. This social or political objective
was carried forward by Congress "in the Miller-Tydings and Mc-
Guire Acts and in the creation of the Small Business Adminis-
tration." 50 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States," a prosecution
under section 7 of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court observed:
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But
we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote compe-
tion for the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses.
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and mar-
kets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of de-
centralization. 52
In listing the several important changes made by the Robinson-
Patman Amendment, the court in Sano observed that "the shift
in emphasis is said to be from injury to the market to injury
to the competitor."' 53 Regardless whether it is thwarted in sub-
stantial amount, the political postulate is not embodied in the
48 United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F2d 416, 427-29 (2d
Cir. 1945).
49 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting).5 0 Burns, A Study of the Antitrust Laws 509 (1958).
5 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
52 Id. at 344.
3 Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., supra note 11, at 352.
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neat phrase "if equality cannot help, discrimination cannot in-
jure."
Protection of the wholesaler or other middleman affords pro-
tection to many small businesses beyond the wholesaling industry.
In a true sense, the wholesale distributor is the banker and finan-
cier for his retailers and suppliers. He pays the manufacturer
shortly after the receipt of goods and extends credit to the
retailer.
Inasmuch as 97 percent of these small businessman enjoy no
mercantile or commercial credit rating, this relationship has
no equal in the American industrial economy.
If deprived of the wholesaler's credit, granted chiefly on the
basis of character and confidence, the retail merchant could not
long survive in business.
Should the wholesaler disappear from the economic picture,
very few new small retail enterprises could be started.54
Predictions of the small businessman's demise have been ex-
aggerated. In 1932, it was predicted that if the relative rate of
growth of large companies from 1909 to 1929 were to continue,
by 1950 seventy percent of all corporate activity would be car-
ried on by 200 corporations.5 The figure proved to be 40.5 per-
cent.50
In an attack which assumes that the political postulate that
the protection of small, independent businessmen is a desirable
objective regardless of its effect on competition has found too
cozy a home in the Robinson-Patman Amendment, the Amend-
ment has been decried by many as an undesirable, anticompet-
itive adjunct to the antitrust laws, in conflict with the basic public
policy toward competition expressed in the Sherman Act. 7 In
this context the Supreme Court stated in Automatic Canteen Co.
v. FTC:
Although due consideration is to be accorded to administrative
construction where alternative interpretation is fairly open, it
is our duty to reconcile such interpretation, except where Con-
54 Hearings on H.R. 848, supra note 27, at 7.
55 Berle & Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property 40 (1932).
56 Federal Trade Commission, "Report on Changes in Concentration in Manu-
facturing, 1935 to 1947 and 1950" at 17 (1954). A.D.H. Kaplan of the Brookings
Institute estimated that in 1929 the 100 largest industrial corporations had 25.5% of
the assets and 43.4% of the income before taxes of all industrial corporations. Accord-
ing to his estimates, by 1948 the corresponding percentage of assets was 26.7, a rise
of 12 percentage points, and the corresponding percentage of profits was 30.4, a fall
of 13 percentage points. See Kaplan, Big Enterprise and the Competitive System
126-27 (1954).
¢ Burns, op. cit. supra note 50, at 117-22.
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gress has told us not to, with the broader antitrust policies that
have been laid down by Congress.5 s
A concept fundamental to competition is that the inefficient,
whether small or large, not only will but should be destroyed by
the competitive process! The Federal Trade Commission opposed
mandatory functional discounts as conductive of undue rigidity
in the channels of distribution. 9 It is argued that the Robinson-
Patman Amendment is a form of public regulation which tends to
result in price uniformity and rigidity rather than vigorously com-
petitive price policies leading to lower prices, and that it impedes
the development and introduction of cheaper and more efficient
methods of production and distribution. 0 It may be something of
this desire to reconcile the Robinson-Patman Amendment with the
policies of the Sherman Act that helped the courts in Goodman,
Sano, and Secatore's to conclude that "if equality cannot help, dis-
crimination cannot injure."
Apart from the political postulate, there may be economic
reasons why the phrase is an inapt addition to Robinson-Patman
law. It is difficult to see how injury to competition can be evaluated
without some prior determination of why a discriminatory price
policy was effected by the seller. A variety of reasons-some licit,
some illicit-may account for price differential policies. In terms of
broad categories, businessmen may discriminate in price (1) to
meet the equally low price of a rival seller; (2) to take advantage
of efficiencies of quantity sales or particular methods of dealing; (3)
predatorily, to eliminate a weaker rival; or (4) in response to the
coercion of oligopolistic buyers.61
If a seller cuts prices to selected buyers to meet the equally
low lawful price of a competitor,62 he is fully protected by the
proviso of section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Amendment.
Moreover, a good faith meeting of the competition is an absolute
defense; that is, the defense will prevail even if it is shown that
the price differential was injurious to competition in terms of
unfavored buyers from the seller invoking the defense. 3
If the seller cuts prices to certain buyers to take advantage of
the efficiencies of quantity sales or particular methods of dealing,
he is protected by the first proviso of section 2 (b) of the Robinson-
58346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
59 Hearings on H.R. 848, supra note 27, at 24.
60 Burns, op. cit. supra note 50, at 513-14.
61 Stocking, Workable Competition and Antitrust Policy 228-29 (1961).
62 The competitor must be the seller's own, and not a competitor of the buyer.
FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
63 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, supra note 30.
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Patman Amendment. Thus, any actual efficiencies of mass dis-
tribution or direct distribution to large buyers are without the
proscription of the act. Although the question remains unsettled,
an exception to the protection of the cost justification proviso may
occur in the area of marginal cost pricing. A seller with excess
capacity will reduce his losses or increase his profits by the amount
that the price of additional sales exceeds the marginal cost of those
sales, even though the price on such additional sales is insufficient
to cover the average cost per sale based on the total fixed and
variable costs of all sales. The practice of marginal cost pricing may
be economically justifiable, but it is questionable whether it is
protected under the cost justification proviso; a manufacturing or
processing seller's advantages from sales based on marginal cost
prices would relate in substantial part to greater use of production
capacity, but the cost justification proviso is only available where
economics of manufacturing, sales, or delivery are related to dis-
tribution techniques, sales or delivery." The significance of marginal
cost pricing, however, regardless of whether it is proscribed by the
Robinson-Patman Act, cannot be too great because empirical data
indicates that very little production is controlled by marginal cost
pricing.," Moreover, the Attorney General's Committee has sug-
gested that the terms of the present act might be so applied as to
"impede no price variation reasonably related to economies in any
of the seller's costs deriving from significant differences among
customers or broad categories of commercial transactions." 67
In any case in which the seller engages in predatory price dis-
crimination to drive a weaker rival out of the market, he ought not
have a defense under the Robinson-Patman Amendment, even
though there is no showing of a general injury to competition. This
is the prevailing rule with respect to selective or geographic price
cutting aimed at eliminating a smaller, localized rival in horizontal
competition with the discriminating seller." The difficulty of show-
ing injury to competition where but one small businessman is
eliminated from the market was one of the reasons why the empha-
sis on injury to competition in section 2 of the Clayton Act was
shifted, in part, to injury to a competitor under the Robinson-Pat-
man Amendment.6 9 Apart from the political postulate supporting
64 See American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951).
05 Att'y. Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 172 (1955).
66 Means, Pricing Power and Public Interest 205-12 (1962).
67 Att'y. Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 175 (1955).
68 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
69 S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936) stated:
It tends to exclude from the bill otherwise harmless violations of its letter,
but accomplishes a substantial broadening of a similar clause now contained in
1965]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the Robinson-Patman Amendment, and apart from any considera-
tion of business ethics, it is difficult to see how the elimination of a
smaller rival through predatory price discrimination can be eco-
nomically justified. This is a demise by definition unrelated to
either overall economic efficiency of the discriminating seller or the
relative economic inefficiency of the smaller rival toward whom the
unfair competition is directed. On the contrary, a successful attack
can only lead to further monopolization or oligopolization, and a
concomitant increase in the power of the discriminating seller to
establish non-competitive prices. Moreover, there is no reason why
the same anti-competitive result would not obtain by the predatory,
non-economic elimination of a competitor or potential competitor,
whether or not he is also a customer, if he is in the succession of
markets of vertical distribution rather than in horizontal markets.
The discriminating seller has additional power to control prices in
vertical channels-power unrelated to demonstrated efficiencies in
distribution techniques.
Perhaps the justification for price discrimination becomes most
equivocal in terms of injury to competition where a seller is coerced
into cutting his prices by the pressure of an oligopolistic or power-
ful buyer. In considering this explanation for price discrimination,
however, it must be distinguished from price differentials which
are either cost-justified, or result from meeting competition in good
faith. Price concessions to a powerful buyer may exceed differen-
tials related either to market competition or to economic efficiencies
of size or method. In Fruitvale Canning Co. 70 the Federal Trade
Commission took the position that "as we view it, the main thrust
of the Robinson-Patman Act was to curb the predatory use of
monopoly power by chain stores and mass buyers and to preserve
the place of small business as well as to protect its competitive
position." 71 1 submit, however, that the future objective in the
development of Robinson-Patman law ought to be the preservation
of a competitive economic structure designed to serve the overrid-
ing interests of consumers rather than to protect the status of indi-
vidual firms, whatever their size and whatever their position in
vertical channels of distribution. Inasmuch as notions of "perfect"
or "pure" competition are only of historical or academic interest,
section 2 of the Clayton Act. The latter has in practice been too restrictive, in
requiring a showing of general injury to competitive conditions in the line of com-
merce concerned; whereas the more immediately important concern is in injury
to the competitor victimized by the discrimination. Only through such injuries, in
fact, can the larger injury result, and to catch the weed in the seed will keep it
from coming to flower.
7 0 Fruitvale Canning Co., supra note 39.
71 Id. at 1517.
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and concepts of "effective" or "workable" competition are the tools
of economic analysis, the difficult question arises as to what con-
stitutes a competitive market structure in vertical markets.
The question of vertical conflicts in distribution--"the vertical
struggle between different levels of distribution, between manufac-
turer and wholesaler, wholesaler and retailer, or manufacturer and
retailer"--is neglected by economic theoreticians, who in the past
have focused on horizontal and intertype competition. 2 While case
law dealing with vertical conflicts in distribution, in accordance with
the mandate of the Robinson-Patman Amendment, deals in sub-
stantial part with the notion of injury to competition, in the one
economic thesis dealing with vertical conflicts in distribution, John
Kenneth Galbraith suggests that the shortcoming of "workable
competition" as an analytical tool "lies in the preoccupation with
competition." 73 Galbraith contended that "power on one side of the
market creates both the need for, and the prospect of reward to, the
exercise of countervailing power from the other side." 7 Thus, the
public interest is theoretically protected by big seller against big
buyer, big employer against big government, big employer against
big union, and so on. Although the buying power of chain stores
was a major factor behind the adoption of the Robinson-Patman
Amendment, Galbraith specially condemns the application of the
Robinson-Patman Act to the grocery chains on the ground that
they developed in response to the original power of food processors
and producers, and the concessions obtained by the vigorous bar-
gaining of the chains operated effectively in the interest of con-
sumers.7' Thus, under this thesis administration of the Robinson-
Patman Amendment ought not to proscribe price discrimination
coerced from a seller by the excessive market power of the buyer.
The efficacy of the Galbraithian thesis is not, however, beyond
dispute, even in the food industry. One study of the food industry
indicated that the large sellers who discriminated in favor of the
chains were able to entrench themselves and retain a highly
remunerative price structure in sales to buyers other than the
chains, and the net result of the power on opposite sides of the
market was to soften competition. 7 Furthermore, countervailing
power does not control every industry. For example, Galbraith
72 Palamountain, op. cit. supra note 28, at 48-49.
73 Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power 61
(1952).
74 Id. at 120.
75 Id. at 147-49.
76 Dirlam & Kahn, Antitrust Law and Big Buyer, Another Look at the A. & P.
Case 225 (1952).
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noted that the oil industry had secured itself from the exercise of
countervailing power 77 and, while a progressive industry, oil "is
an unquestioned oligopoly... [and] it has rarely been free of the
suspicion of holding prices above the level that would be associated
with more vigorous price competition."" It was in the oil industry
that the courts in Secatore's and Sano found such keen price com-
petition that they refused to heed cries from what Galbraith would
there call the weak side of the market. Whatever the validity of the
concept of countervailing power, however, its incorporation into
the antitrust laws would seem to rest with the discretion of Con-
gress; the history of the Robinson-Patman Amendment as it now
stands would tend to indicate a Congressional intent to prohibit the
excessive use of vertical power and limit concessions to powerful
buyers to demonstrable cost savings resulting from the economic
efficiencies of their market position.
CONCLUSION
Neither Goodman, Secatore's nor Sano reached the question
of why the respective sellers had followed concededly discriminatory
price policies. Yet in terms of both the political and economic
justifications for the Robinson-Patman Amendment, predatory
price discrimination and price discrimination in response to the
excessive market power of favored buyers may be anti-competitive
in effect. While the phrase "if equality cannot help, discrimination
cannot injure" may have some logical appeal, it finds no expression
in the act or its history. The Supreme Court has concluded that
"the statute does not require that the discrimination must in fact
have harmed competition, but only that there is a reasonable pos-
sibility that it 'may' have such effect." '9 Perhaps an argument that
"the greater the price discrimination, the more likely the injury to
competition" would be an appropriate answer to "the gist of Seca-
tore's." The simple formula of adding overhead and profit to a
middleman's price to read him or his customer's out of effective
competition with direct buyers lower in the channel of distribution,
even while purportedly taking account of customer service, con-
venience, and other non-price factors of competition, seems to be
an oversimplification of both the economic and political postulates
which control the administration of the Robinson-Patman Amend-
ment. Moreover, it invites perpetuation of concessions to buyers
resulting from excessive market power rather than cost justification;
7 Galbraith, op. cit. supra note 73, at 127.
781d. at 97.
7 Corn Products Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945).
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and it invites the predatory destruction of vertical competitors with
the objective not of more efficient distribution, but rather of ver-
tical integration or control to facilitate the effectuation of non-com-
petitive price policies.
The act does not proscribe rigid channels of distribution; any
seller is free to adopt a mixed policy of distribution channels or
even to eliminate middlemen entirely." While the act permits the
seller the choice of selling to the consumer and the retailer at the
same price, or refusing to sell to either of them, it should not permit
him to increase the competitive disadvantage to the retailer once
he has decided to sell to both. Similarly while it permits the seller
the choice of selling to the wholesaler and the retailer at the same
price, or refusing to sell to either of them, it should not permit him
to increase the competitive disadvantage to the wholesaler once he
has decided to sell to both.
Allaz R. Rule
80 Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F2d 1, 10 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 138 U.S. 948 (1950).
